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Abstract:  The relations between the United States and Pakistan (US-Pakistan 
relations) have a very tumultuous history, which is spread over nearly six decades. 
Owing to the diverse strategic and, sometimes, incompatible strategic interests, these 
relations have seen various engagements and estrangements. This paper aims at 
exploring the role played by the geostrategic and geopolitical factors in bringing US 
closer to Pakistan. It takes into account the cost and benefits of these relations for 
Pakistan and the United States. It also highlights the present warmth in relations 
between the United States and Pakistan in the perspective of geo-strategic and 
geopolitical factors. It also discusses the future prospects of these relations. 
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Résumé: Les relations entre les États-Unis et le Pakistan (les relations 
américano-pakistanaises) ont une histoire très tumultueuse, qui s'étale sur près de six 
décennies. En raison des stratégies diverses et, parfois, des intérêts  stratégiques 
incompatibles, ces relations ont vu des engagements et des brouilles variés. Le présent 
article vise à étudier le rôle de la géostratégie et des facteurs géopolitiques qui 
ramènent les États-Unis plus proches du Pakistan. Il prend en compte le coût et les 
avantages de ces relations pour le Pakistan et les États-Unis. Il souligne également le 
réchauffement présent dans les relations entre les États-Unis et le Pakistan dans la 
perspective de géostratégie et  des facteurs géopolitiques. Il aborde également les 
perspectives futures de ces relations. 
Mots-Clés:  relations américano-pakistanaises; facteurs géostratégiques; facteurs 
géopolitiques 
  
 
“Geography determines a nation’s history – the political significance of an area bears a 
well-defined relation to its climate, land forms and natural resources.” 
                                                                                                     A Napoleonic Dictum 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
US-Pakistan relations are greatly indebted to the geo-strategic and geopolitical significance of the latter. 
There is no denying the fact that geography controls the political environment of a country and the same 
is true about Pakistan. Besides opportunities, the geography poses some challenges too. There is no 
escape from one’s geography and from its impact on one’s policies (Mujtaba Razvi, 2001.). The security of 
a state largely depends upon the extent to which it adopts a vigilant policy towards her neighbors that 
postulates a sound frontier policy. It is also stated by the scholars of international politics and diplomacy 
that the defense and foreign policies of the ‘small’ and ‘weak’ states do contribute to shape regional and 
international politics (Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2001). All these are true for Pakistan. Looking at the past, it can 
be seen that owing to the strategic worth of South Asia, it has always been the focus of world attention 
and after the partition of Indian subcontinent in 1947 into two independent states of Pakistan and India, 
its importance remained the same. Both the states were viewed as key players in checking the influence 
of communist threat emanating from both Soviet Union and China. 
In 1947, possessing a unique geographical location, Pakistan consisted two distant parts; the West 
Pakistan, in the Indus River basin and the East Pakistan (later on became Bangladesh in December 1971) 
located more than 1000 miles (1600 kilometers) away in the Ganges River delta. Separated from each 
other, these two wings had 1000km wide Indian territory between them. On the West, Pakistan borders 
with Afghanistan, whose one kilometer narrow Wahkhan strip kept the defunct Soviet Union away from 
Pakistani frontiers. To the North, she has the Peoples Republic of China. The oil rich heart of the Persian 
Gulf region–Iran, is in the northwest of Pakistan. In the South, the Arabian Sea, the northwestern 
extension of the strategically important Indian Ocean washes Pakistan’s coastal shores. The vitality of 
Indian Ocean has remained unquestionable throughout the known history as it provides not only a 
commercial and trade link between Europe and the Far East but has also remained a key to the seven seas. 
The East Pakistan was separating the Pacific Ocean from the Indian Ocean and bordered Burma on the 
East (Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, 1993). Thus, looking from the strategic point of view, Pakistan was and 
is still at the crossroad of Central, South and Southwest Asia and is the easiest link between the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf and the East Asia. In short, Pakistan is situated in the region called ‘fulcrum of Asia’ the 
strategic centre on which the stability of the Asia depends (Ibid., p. 202.). Apart from enjoying the 
proximity with the strategically significant regions, Pakistan, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
faced the grave geopolitical realities on the ground as it was in the most troublesome region where the 
clash of interests between the two superpowers of that time was imminent (Farhat Mahmud, 1991). There 
were also certain intra-regional conflicts (Rizvi, p. 202.) that were startling Pakistan and added much to 
her agonies. The circumstances of Pakistan’s origin and the composition as well as the unique 
geographical features (especially from 1947 to 1971) had made it particularly a security-conscious 
country (Razvi, P. 184). At the same time she was faced with economic deficiencies as a newly 
independent state. 
Looking at the geostrategic scenario of the region, it becomes obvious that Pakistan was faced with a 
generally hostile geopolitical and geo-strategic environment because of the pattern of her relationship 
with her immediate neighbors i.e. India and Afghanistan. The Indo-Pak relations had always been 
characterized by mutual distrust, hostility and serious disagreements on regional and international 
political issues since day one of their creation in 1947. India had not accepted Pakistan and she was 
constantly engaged in weakening Pakistan (Shahid M. Amin, 2004). The Indian leaders wanted the 
hegemony of India over the entire subcontinent. To achieve that end, they were openly striving to merge 
Pakistan with India. The forceful annexation of the Muslim States of Hyderabad (Deccan) and Kashmir 
in 1947-1948, the deployment of a massive part of her army and all her armor on Pakistani border and 
imposition of a war, just within a year of partition, were clear indications of the Indian hegemonic 
designs (Chaudhri, P.148). India was applying not only warfare tactics but was also exerting political and 
psychological pressure of relentless propaganda against the very raison d'être of the origin of Pakistan. 
Indian leadership, with the help of some other countries, was also engaged in isolating Pakistan from the 
comity of nations (P.39). Pakistan was in a real stalemate and she had to look for an external ally to check 
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the Indian designs. Therefore, the entire edifice of Pakistan’s foreign policy was based upon Indian fear 
(P.1). 
Pakistan’s relations with her western neighbor–Afghanistan, had also been far from cordial due to the 
Pukhtoonistan issue 2. It was in 1947, that the Afghan government denounced the 1893’s Anglo-Afghan 
treaty of the demarcation of an international boundary between Afghanistan and India (then a British 
colony). She also launched her irredentist claim over the North Western Pukhtoon 3 populated area and 
started supporting secessionist elements in Pakistan. Afghanistan was also pampered by India by 
extending support on this issue. Afghanistan also had the Soviet Union on her back. Moreover, 
Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations (Abdul 
Sattar, 2001) This wave of tension kept creeping under the carpet but was not allowed by King Zahir Shah, 
the then Afghan king, to take a violent form although his cousin Sardar Mohammad Daud was fanning it 
(Ibid., pp. 381-382.). However, Pakistan had a perception of resurrection of this issue. 
This precarious geopolitical situation confronted Pakistan with two-fold security concerns. This fear 
was further aggravated due to the narrow strategic waist of Pakistan as all her major cities were border 
outposts especially one of her provincial capitals, Peshawar, was just next to the border (Rizvi, pp. 
202-204.).  
In such a grim geopolitical milieu, Pakistan needed a strong, modern, well-equipped and 
hard-hitting army capable of combating any threat arising from her western or eastern border that 
could jeopardize her national security and territorial integrity (Ibid) Pakistan had a number of 
options for making her security invincible and to keep her national integrity intact. But the common 
democratic ideals, the westernized bureaucratic set-up and, above all, the inclination of her armed 
forces towards the United States pushed Pakistan to opt for a close US-Pakistan relationship in 
order to get a strong external equalizer against the regional threats to her national security and 
territorial integrity (Mahmud,and General K. M. Arif,). Pakistani leaders were fully aware of the 
strategic importance of this nascent state (Aziz Ahmed Khan, July 1960; and Dr. Safdar Mahmood, 1984). 
These leaders even could not afford to ignore the geopolitical compulsion of their country for they 
had influenced the course of Pakistan’s foreign policy throughout the history (Chaudhri, p. 230.). 
Moreover, the economic needs of the country were considered to be best catered by the 
economically potent United States. 
 
FIRST PHASE 
 
Pakistan, therefore, started efforts to win the United States’ strategic and economic support (Mahmud, 
p. 6). But till 1949, the United States did not respond in the same coin as the focus of world-politics, 
at that time, was Europe. Europe was passing through a very critical situation and there was a race 
between the United States and Soviet Union to win its support. Therefore, the United States was 
giving much importance to Europe than any other region in the world. However, during 1949-1951, 
just after the communist triumph in China, the war on the Korean Peninsula, and the volatile 
political situation in the Middle East, the strategic analysts in the United States started to realize the 
importance of Pakistan’s geographic location (Abdul Sattar, 2007). The US States Department, in a 
policy statement, recognized the leading role of Pakistan in the Middle Eastern region and viewed it 
as a potential balancer in the South Asian power paradigm but looked at India as a Japan’s successor 
                                                        
2 The Afghan government had signed a border agreement with the British government in 1885, according to which 
border between Afghanistan and the United India, of which Pakistan was a part before partition in 1947, was 
demarcated and given the name of ‘Durand Line’. But after the departure of British from the Indian sub-continent 
and the subsequent partition of India into India and Pakistan, Afghanistan started an irredentist claim over the 
North-Western part of Pakistan and gave it the name of Pukhtoonistan. Afghanistan has not only been taking up this 
issue from time to time but has also been extending support to the secessionist elements in Pakistan. 
3 A nationality occupying the North-Western province of Pakistan who speaks Pashto language. The largest part of 
this nationality is living on the Afghan side and makes the dominant part of the Afghan population. 
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in Asiatic imperialism4. The United States desired the use of air bases and other facilities in 
Pakistan during any possible combat with the communist countries, especially Soviet Union and 
China5. Formerly, the US administration had tried to build up India as the leader of Asia to check the 
flow of communism from China into Asia but on calculating Indian tilt towards non-alignment, her 
reluctance to join the US camp, her role in Korean War, a visible change came into US policy 
(Farzana Shakoor, January 2001). Keeping in view the catastrophe of the spread of communist dogma 
from Soviet Union into the South and Southwest Asia and into the oil rich Middle East region, the 
United States seriously diverted her attention to these areas and decided to form a ring of alliances 
in order to curb this menace (K. M. Arif, p. 390; and S. Adil Hussain, p. 11.). The rapid political changes in 
the Middle East were also adding to the US discomfort. In these circumstances, the United States 
found Pakistan as the most important, comfortable and valued asset6. Pakistan was also ready to 
fulfill US strategic objectives (Mahmud, pp. 1-3) not only due to the peculiar geopolitical 
requirements but also in order to gain economic and military assistance that was essential for her 
national security and territorial integrity. But still the United States did not want to antagonize India. 
The officials of the State Department were not in favor of giving any military assistance to Pakistan 
because they said, “India is the power in South Asia. We should seek to make it our ally rather than 
cause it to be hostile to us. Pakistan is distressingly weak”. The US ambassador went to the extent of 
saying: “It is a bad arithmetic to alienate 360 million Indians in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis 
who are split into two sections” (Chaudhri, p. 232). The US-President, Eisenhower, and Secretary of 
State, Foster Dulles, were also not dismissive of these views 7 but the vital strategic interests in the 
Middle East were considered more important by them. The upheavals in the Middle East and a 
perception of threat to the West’s control over the strategic oil resources necessitated a new policy 
requiring cooperation of Pakistan in arrangements for the defence of the region (Abdul Sattar, pp. 
356-357.). The induction of a nationalist government in Iran and nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company testifying to the decline of British power and prestige triggered the new US policy of 
direct involvement in the defence of the region. Therefore, by 1952, Pakistan came to be looked 
upon as a potential partner in the arrangements aimed at the containment of the Red Peril, the Soviet 
communism. Testifying before a congressional committee, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
described Pakistan as ‘a real bulwark’ and remarked that the religious convictions and martial spirit 
found in Pakistan can play a pivotal role against communism (K. Arif (ed.), 1984) On June 1, 1953, in 
an address to the American people, the US Secretary of State expressed the same feelings and it was 
perhaps the first official introduction of Pakistan to the American people (Chaudhri, p. 138). In other 
words, it was the geo-political and geo strategic importance of Pakistan which brought her into the 
limelight of world politics and there established a close strategic partnership between Pakistan and 
the United States in early 1950s (Mahmud, pp. 1-2). The United States regarded Pakistan not only as a 
major player in the containment of communism but envisaged military of Pakistan as a ‘stabilizing 
force’, in the Middle East, and, even in Southeast Asia (Ibid., p. 8). The United States established 
close ties with the Pakistan Army to curb any possible anti-US or pro-communist popular 
movement in Pakistan, to keep the country’s policies in line with the United States and grab power 
itself if the politicians show signs of derailing the US interests8. In 1958, when there was felt a 
mounting popular and political pressure for bourgeoisie democratic reforms and withdrawal from 
                                                        
4 See Department of States Policy Statement with respect to Pakistan (3 April 1950) quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), The 
United States and Pakistan…, pp. 17-19. 
5 See US National Security Council Staff Study (98/1): “The Position of the United States with respect to South 
Asia,” (approved by President Truman on 25 January 1951) quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), The United States and 
Pakistan…, pp. 20-21. 
6  See First Report of President Truman on the Mutual Security Programme, December 1951; Abdul Sattar, 
Pakistan's Foreign Policy…, p. 42. 
7 In a statement John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State, stressed for the flow of US aid to India despite 
the constant reluctance of the latter to join the US camp against communist countries. He said, “If she (India) lost the 
economic competition to China, it would mean the loss of another 350 million people to communism”, see S.M. 
Burke, 1990, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 226. 
8 Ibid. 
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US backed defense pact, the Pakistan army led by General Ayub Khan staged a coup, abrogated the 
constitution and banned all political parties (Ibid., pp. 18-19). This military coup gave support to the 
American and British interests (Sangat Singh, 1970). Ayub Khan, the then military ruler had, later on, 
revealed that he had consulted officials in Washington, including the CIA Chief, Allen Dulles, 
before declaring Martial Law in Pakistan (Mahmud, p. 20). Ayub Khan had also spoken about his 
visits of the United States in May 1958 and he said that he had held extensive discussions with 
General Nathan Twining and Services Chiefs (Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1967). This US-backed military 
take over retarded the already delayed progress of constitutional development in Pakistan, 
politicized the army and increased the role of army at the cost of civilian and democratic institutions 
(Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2000). Neil H. McElroy, the US Defense Secretary, who was present in Karachi 
just one day before the military’s taking control of power, defended the military coup in the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959 (Rizvi,p. 80). The US State Department also termed 
Pakistan-military as “the greatest stabilizing force in the county” (Chaudhri, p. 148.). These 
statements fully endorsed the active US involvement in the military and polity of Pakistan that was 
in the US interests. In early 1950s, Pakistan, under the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, had joined 
the US-backed alliances, SEATO (1954) and Baghdad Pact (1955). The latter was subsequently 
renamed as CENTO9. One of the major reasons for Pakistan’s participation in these pacts was 
propounded as the desire to strengthen her defense vis-à-vis India10. Pakistan, with the US support, 
wanted to check the Indian hegemonic tendencies and to prevent India from becoming a regional 
power by usurping the independence of her small neighbors and put their territorial security and 
national integrity at stake11. Thus, it becomes obvious that the United States had a global agenda 
while Pakistan had a narrow regional security perception. But in spite of all the divergence of 
interests, the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan brought the United States in close strategic 
collaboration with the former. It was an arrangement between two ‘unequal partners’. Ironically, 
this collaboration was at the cost of Pakistan’s relations with her two neighboring states; People’s 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The aforementioned US-baked pacts alienated Pakistan 
from the Soviet Union and the latter got closer to India. The Soviet leaders supported the Indian 
stance over Kashmir issue and backed the Kabul regime on the issue of Pukhtoonistan. Resultantly, 
the Kashmir issue found no solution under the ‘United Nations Resolutions’ due to the 
overwhelming opposition of the Soviet Union. On Kashmir issue, the Soviet leaders clearly stood 
by the Indian claim when, in November 1955 during a visit to Srinagar, the Soviet leaders declared 
it as an integral part of India. In 1962, the Soviet veto to the resolution submitted in the United 
Nation’s Security Council for the solution of longstanding Kashmir issue was the direct outcome of 
close US-Pakistan relationship that had sowed seeds of distrust and antagonism between Pakistan 
and the Soviet Union (Ibid., p. 52.). Apart from India, Afghanistan also remained hostile to Pakistan. 
During Ayub era (1958-1969), Pakistan adopted an anti-China policy in the footstep of the United 
States and even on the UN forum voted against People’s Republic of China (Mahmud, p. 65). All 
these arrangements could not even provide Pakistan with any leverage against India as the United 
States and Western powers were afraid of annoying India12. It is evident from the fact that when 
India approached the United States for clarification of Pakistan Foreign Office’s interpretation of 
the 1959’s US-Pakistan Mutual Assistance Agreement, the United States assured India that this 
agreement could not be used against her (Jawaharlal Nehru, 1964) It was a clear indication that the 
United States was exploiting the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan for the sake of her own 
security interests but was not ready to defend the latter against Indian aggression that was the main 
                                                        
9 CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) was the name given to the Baghdad Pact after the withdrawal of Iraq from it 
in 1959. Pakistan had joined it in 1955. Iran, United Kingdom and Turkey were also its members; See also Mahmud, 
A History of US-Pakistan…, p. 3.  
10 Rizvi, The Military and Politics…p. 80; also see “Pakistan’s Current Economic Situation and Prospects,” 
Intelligence Report No. 7706 of the office of Intelligence Research of Department of States, 15 May 1958. 
11 Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Troubled …, p. 148. 
12 The agreements that Pakistan entered with the US in mid and late 1950s did nothing to boost Pakistan’s security 
but they helped in providing Pakistan armed forces with the latest weapons and technologies available at that time, 
see  Farzana Shakoor, “Pakistan-US Relations…”, pp. 19-20; Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Troubled World…, p. 151. 
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concern and the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan was the only country that could 
facilitate the United States to have a close watch on the Soviet and Chinese activities through her 
espionage technology system and which could enable her to counteract them. Therefore, this 
urgency to get an air-base in Pakistan made the United States to sign an agreement with Pakistan in 
1959. As a result of close US-Pakistan partnership, an American airbase was established near 
Badabher, a village in the suburb of Peshawar. Pakistan got nothing in return except increasing her 
burden of geopolitical compulsions and problems. That is why the United States has always 
preferred military dictators over democratically elected governments in Pakistan. But this nexus of 
Pakistan army with the CIA and Pentagon (headquarter of the US army) brought a great havoc to the 
democratic and judicial institutions of Pakistan. It politicized military that, in turn, undermined the 
democratic and political culture in Pakistan and resulted in the dismemberment of the Eastern wing 
of the country in 1971, as it created a sense of deprivation due to prolonged military rule 
(1958-1971). Moreover, the establishment of US-military base in Pakistan made the latter more 
vulnerable to the Soviet incursion when the Soviet leaders warned Pakistan of the dire 
consequences after the shooting down of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft which had taken off from that 
base (Amin, p. 45). According to The New York Times, Pakistan would have been the direct victim, 
had any conflict taken place between the United States and Soviet Union 13. Thus, the defense 
problem of Pakistan not only remained unresolved but also became more critical while the military 
as an institution got strengthened.  
The other determining factor in the US-Pakistan relationship was the precarious and volatile 
geo-strategic scenario in the Middle East. In the late 1950s, Arab nationalism got a new impetus in the 
Middle East when Jamal Abdul Nasir became the president of Egypt and united the two important 
countries; Egypt and Syria into United Arab Republic in 1958. Moreover, in the wake of WW-II, the 
British withdrawal from the Suez Canal had given way to a power vacuum and to the Anglo-Egypt 
confrontation over the nationalization of strategically important Suez Canal. These and some other 
developments urged the United States to focus more on this region. The United States was already 
alarmed by the Korean War (1950) and the socialist revolution in China and the nationalization of US oil 
companies in Iran. She had also faced a humiliating defeat in Vietnam and could not afford to loose 
ground to the Soviets in the Middle East, the vital strategic zone to the world politics. Therefore, the 
United States and her Western allies envisaged a plan of setting up a Middle East Defence Organization 
(MEDO) on the pattern of NATO but geopolitical environment in this region was different from Europe 
and the idea of collective security could not get fame in the Arab States of the Middle East (Chaudhri, p. 
150). But the non-Arab pro-US states such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, took it as a blessing in disguise 
and overwhelmingly provided their shoulder to carry on this US agenda. Pakistan enjoyed the status of 
most valued ally in the region and reaped some benefits but the costs incurred were greater. Her defense 
dilemma remained intact but got some confidence in the face of Indian threat. The deep sense of 
insecurity on the part of Pakistan lessened when Pakistan’s army organized and modernized itself due to 
sufficient US-arms supply and military training facilities under the above-mentioned pacts. This military 
aid also strengthened the position of military at the domestic level as it had the resources, hierarchal 
system, discipline and esprit de corps which made it the most influential and modernized segment of the 
society (Rizvi, pp. 199-208).  
 
SECOND PHASE 
 
In fact, during early 1950s and later 1960s, the US-Pakistan relations remained hostage to the Cold War 
paradigm and the former wasted no time in changing her priorities when she found another broker in the 
region. Therefore, in early 1960s, there came a great shift in the US policy towards South Asia and she 
put much of her weight behind India to check the influence of communist China into the South Asian 
region. In early 1962, the United States had started supporting India against communist China 14. 
Simultaneously, the US administration successfully deterred Pakistan from taking advantage of the 
                                                        
13 The New York Times, (4 July 1960), cited in Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy…,  p. 45. 
14 The Wall Street Journal (9 July 1962). 
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Sino-India conflict through diplomatic channels. This US move was to save India from a two-front war 
15. But the entire charm of US-Pakistan relationship withered away in October 1962 when the US 
administration decided to support India both militarily and economically and at the same time asked 
Pakistan to provide assurance to India that the former will not create problems for the latter during her 
war against China (Naunihal Singh, 2006). Pakistan made it clear that the entire political spectrum in 
Pakistan was opposed to the US military aid and to offer any assurance to India. But the United States 
had decided to help India to make her a regional power to counterweight the potential menace of 
communist expansion in Asia16. Therefore, President Kennedy, in reply to Pakistan, said, “question of 
assurances is [a] matter for Pakistani decision, but [the] US is interested in stopping the advance of 
communism in Asia (Naunihal Singh, pp. 154-160). The changing geo-strategic realities in South Asia 
urged the US and Western leaders to support Indian hegemonic role in the region. The United States 
wished a strong barrier against communist China while India needed dollars, war arsenals and 
propaganda devices to establish her hegemony in South and Southeast Asia. In November 1962, the 
Indian premier requested the United States for direct and substantial military aid by providing two 
squadrons of B-47 US-bombers and 12 squadrons of US-supersonic fighters manned by the US crew to 
defend the Indian cities and installations against possible Chinese air-attacks. Therefore, the United 
States and the Western powers rushed to help India both militarily and economically. The United States 
took the lead by announcing $100 million annual aid for India (Chaudhri, pp. 158-159; and Naunihal Singh, 
pp. 158-159). The first outcome of these new developments transcended the geo-strategic relevance of 
India for the United States and consequently US-Pakistan relations got strained and Pakistan became 
disenchanted in spite of her enthusiastic policy of alignment (Chaudhri, p. 232). The new injection of US 
arms aid to India gave rise to a new arms race in South Asia that undermined the future economic growth 
of the region (Mohammad Ayub Khan, January 1964). The regional balance of power got serious blow and 
not only Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance eroded but a grave threat posed to the very security of this 
country. Pakistan reacted strongly against the arms supply to India and established close relationship 
with the Peoples Republic of China by concluding trade, boundary, and civil aviation agreements that 
irritated the United States. The other contributory factor towards close Sino-Pakistan relations was 
India’s intimate relations with the Soviet Union (Tom Rogers, 1994). Pakistan realized that she could no 
longer rely on the United States but marginal military support (Naunihal Singh, p. 207). The close Indo-US 
nexus forced both the Soviet Union and Pakistan to revisit their foreign policies and decided to mend 
their fences in view of the changing geo-strategic realities. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan 
that she adopted a balanced posture towards both powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
without being at the cost of the other17. With the newly emerged situation, it was established that mere 
geo-strategic interest could not provide basis for a durable and long-term relationship between two 
unequal powers. There was a lack of convergence of interests and, therefore, whenever the United States 
achieved the specific geo-strategic objectives, the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan relegated and the 
US-Pakistan engagement has given way to estrangement. The coolness in the US-Pakistan relationship 
encouraged India to speed up her hostilities against Pakistan that resulted in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. 
During this war, the United States withheld military supplies to both Pakistan and India but the former 
was fully aware of the fact India had other sources of procurement of military hardware while Pakistan 
was dependant on US arms supply only (Farzana Shakoor, pp. 19-25). The US attitude towards Pakistan 
during this war was quite sufficient to prove that the US can never come to defend the latter against the 
Indian threat for which Pakistan joined the US backed defense pacts and alienated her from her 
neighbors, the Soviet Union and China. Hence, all these alliances and treaties between Pakistan and the 
United States failed in the fulfillment of the objectives for which they were signed by Pakistan (Rashmi 
Jain, pp. 62-73). In the Cold-War paradigm, the real concern of the United States had been the 
‘communism mania’ that had made her supporting Pakistan and India at one time or the other. America 
supplied military and economic aid to win support of these two Asian powers against communist Soviet 
                                                        
15 On 30 June 1963, the US administration, in a statement, made it clear that US aid to India would remain unabated 
irrespective of the fact that India comes to terms with Pakistan on Kashmir dispute, see S.M. Burke, ‘Pakistan’s 
Foreign Policy’. p. 289. 
16 President Kennedy’s statement assuring Pakistan about military aid to India, 20 November 1962 as quoted in 
Rashmi Jain (ed.), The United States and Pakistan…, pp. 43-44. 
17 Statement by Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 20 May 1968. 
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Union and China but she failed to understand that a serious effort of rapprochement between Pakistan 
and India could bring stability to South Asia that can ultimately check the expansion of communism in 
South Asia (Chaudhri, pp. 154-157). 
In early 1970s, the situation took a new turn when the United States sought Pakistan’s help in the 
establishment of entente with the Peoples Republic of China. The Pakistan-China relations, which the 
former US Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson considered abhorrent, became cardinal 
for US communication with China. To create a new global balance of power, the United States took it 
essential to have normal relations with China and, therefore, wanted to bring it back into the comity of 
nations by her inclusion into the United Nations. The US administration intended to use the US 
relationship with China as a lever for US-Soviet détente (Naunihal Singh, pp. 217-218). To accomplish this 
agenda, she sought Pakistan’s help. Pakistan arranged secret visit of the then US foreign Secretary Henry 
Kissinger. 
 In 1971, the second war between India and Pakistan broke out and the United States again failed in 
helping out Pakistan, the most allied ally of US in South Asia. Although the Nixon administration 
showed some tilt towards Pakistan but did nothing to preserve East Pakistan from dismemberment on 16 
December 1971 (Chaudhri, p. 234). On the contrary, US economic and military aid was stopped 18. On the 
other hand, the Soviet Union fully supported India by providing political, diplomatic and military 
support to the latter (Amin, p. 64). In late 1970s, Pakistan’s international stature and geo-strategic 
importance got a more decisive boost by two major developments; Pakistan’s progress towards the 
acquisition of nuclear capability and the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan (Ibid., p. 78). The nuclear 
program was started by Pakistan in 1972, a few months after the separation of East Pakistan, but got 
impetus in 1974 after the Indian nuclear tests. Pakistan’s nuclear program greatly annoyed the United 
States and she added pace to her efforts for non-proliferation but the main brunt fell on Pakistan. The 
United States turned the ‘most allied ally’ of the 1950s into a vital pariah. Nuclear sanctions were 
imposed against Pakistan under the Symington (1976) and Glen Amendments (1977). The earlier 
US-offer for the sale of A-7 aircraft to Pakistan was withdrawn (Abdul Sattar, pp. 148-152). There were 
reports that in the United States that beside other available options an interagency group, led by 
arm-control expert Gerard Smith, was planning to attack the Kahuta Research Laboratories in Pakistan 
in order to destroy the nuclear capability of Pakistan19. Alarmed by this plan, Pakistan agitated against 
the United States. The US State Department denied the plan categorically but suspicions in Islamabad 
remained unchanged. In November 1979, these relations were touching the lowest ebb. On 21 November 
1979, another bitter incident took place when a mob of students set ablaze the US embassy in Islamabad 
on a report of the indulgence of US administration in the desecration of the Holy Ka’aba. A crisis of 
confidence was there between Pakistan and the United States until the Soviet military intervention into 
Afghanistan (Muhammad Islam, 1994). 
 
THIRD PHASE 
 
In 1979, the world politics took a new and dramatic turn and once again Pakistan’s geo-strategic 
importance came to the lime-light when on 26 December 1979 the Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan 
under the pretext of invitation from the Afghan government (Abdul Sattar, p. 155). It rose Pakistan’s 
geo-strategic and geopolitical relevance to such an extent that the most critical of all the critics to 
Pakistan’s nuclear program, the United States, rushed to revive her strategic and military relationship 
                                                        
18 The US Congress pressed the administration to suspend economic and military aid to Pakistan until a diplomatic 
solution of the crisis is found by Pakistan. on 3 August 1971, the US House of Representatives passed a bill while on 
5 October 1971, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the administration through a resolution to choke all 
aid to Pakistan. See Niloufer Mehdi, 1999, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971-1981: The Search for Security. Lahore: 
Feroz Sons. p. 66. 
19 This story was unveiled by The New York Times. See Richard Brut, ‘U.S. will Press Pakistan to Halt A-Arms 
Project’, and ‘Pakistan Protests to U.S. Envoy on Nuclear Report’. The New York Times (12 and 15 August 1979); 
and Dennis Kux (2003), The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies. Karachi: Oxford 
University Press. p. 240. 
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with the latter and transformed her ‘sanctioned ally’ into the  ‘frontline state role’. The National Security 
Advisor to President Jimmy Carter and the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher rushed to 
Islamabad to discuss the changed geopolitical scenario and offer a military and economic aid from the 
United States (Kux, 2003.). Thus, due to the specific geo-strategic location and geopolitical environment 
of the region, Pakistan not only came out of isolation but also enjoyed the Western and American 
economic and military support.  
The ‘Saur Revolution’ in Afghanistan was a great political development in Pakistan’s neighborhood. 
After this revolution the then Afghan government revived an old irredentist Afghan claim i.e. 
Puktoonistan over the North-Western Pukhtoon populated areas of Pakistan (Abdul Sattar, p. 154). The 
revival of this claim alarmed Pakistani policymakers. This apprehension further aggravated when more 
than 80,000 Soviet troops marched into the Afghan territory and the Pak-Afghan border became insecure 
due to the expansion of the Soviet military influence. Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
enormously stirred Pakistan’s security environment (Islam, p. 65). The Soviet Union not only had a 
history of strained relations with Pakistan but the former had also actively engaged in the 
dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 and nurtured  secessionist insurgencies in Balochistan province 
of Pakistan. It had also played an abhorrent role in the Kashmir problem. Moreover, the Soviet 
communist leadership had an old Tsarist aspiration of having access to the warm water of the Arabian 
Sea (Abdul Sattar, p. 383). These factors multiplied Pakistan’s worries of the future strategic repercussions 
(Rizvi, pp. 213-215). Pakistan had two apprehensions; becoming a periphery state of the Soviet Union, and 
any possible Soviet collusion with India to harm Pakistan20. The Soviet move was viewed to have altered 
the strategic situation in the area in a very ominous fashion, eliminating a buffer state between the Soviet 
Union and Pakistan, and presenting a new threat to Iran21. 
Not only Pakistan but also the South Asian region, as a whole, became vulnerable to the Soviet 
penetration (A. R. Siddiqi, June-July 1982). It was feared in the backdrop of the history of this region that 
any power, in the past, which emerged from the Central Asia and consolidated its hold over Kabul, did 
not stop there but marched into the subcontinent and held sway over it. There was a fear that history 
would repeat itself.  
At the beginning of the Saur revolution, the United States had remained unconcerned about the 
political development in this geographic centre of gravity of Central Asian region, Afghanistan, even at 
the agitation of Iran. Afghanistan was a country of very low priority for the United States and the latter 
was a silent onlooker during the overthrow of the monarchy in 1970s. The US did not bother to review its 
pattern of relations with her old ally, Pakistan, in order to cope with any future insurgency in the region 
as result of this serious development. This indifference on the part of the US administration was mainly 
due to her isolationist policy in the wake of Vietnam War. However, the fall of King Raza Shah Pehlvi, a 
despotic monarch in Iran and the roll over of 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan prompted the United 
States to pay heed to the grave strategic changes in the region (Islam, p. 64). The strategic balance that had 
already changed in favor of the Soviet Union after the US withdrawal from Vietnam was further tilted 
towards the former and serious threats posed to the US and Western interests in the region (Razvi, p. 192; 
also see Islam, p. 67). This Soviet move was a continuation of communist triumphs, which were coming in 
the form of a chain after the success of communism in North Korea, in North Vietnam, communist 
victory in Cuba (1959), and fall of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the orbit of communist dogma. 
Therefore, the Soviet military take-over in Afghanistan urged the United States to check any further 
Soviet advance in the South and East, which could threaten the security of the Persian Gulf and Indian 
Ocean region and jeopardize the supply of oil to the West.  
President Jimmy Carter declared that any attempt by any outside force would be regarded as an assault 
on the vital interests of the United States and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force (Ted Koppel, 24 February 2006). He was clearly referring to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. He went on to say that the United States would use military force to keep the oil lanes open 
(Amin, pp. 84-85). Besides, keeping in view the geopolitical implications, the US administration 
                                                        
20 Dawn (December 14, 1981). 
21 President Carter’s State of the Union Message to joint session of the US Congress, 21 January 1980; and Islam, 
‘The Afghan Factor’, p. 67. 
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interpreted the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in terms of a serious threat to world peace and 
violation of norms of international behavior22. Japan and the Western European countries, which were 
dependant for two-third of their oil requirements on the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, extended their 
full-fledged support to the United States and joined voices to denounce the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (K. Arif,  ed., p. 372; also see Amin, pp. 84-85)[23]. China also looked at the Soviet intervention 
as a potential threat to her own security. Harold Brown, the US Secretary of Defense, visited China and 
discussed that how the United States and China might work to eradicate this common peril (Rizvi, p. 192). 
Thus, China also sided with the United States. The oil-rich states in the Persian Gulf also got alarmed 
(Amin, p. 83).  
In the backdrop of this newly evolved geopolitical and geo-strategic environment, cooperation of the 
regional countries was desperately needed by the United States. Iran and Pakistan were the two 
strategically important countries whose geographical proximity and political influence could provide 
path to check the expansion of Soviet military, political and ideological influence in the South and 
Southwest Asia. They could obstruct her access to the Gulf oil resources and keep it away from 
establishing hegemony in the Indian Ocean that could bring it in direct confrontation with the United 
States (Islam, pp. 67-68). But it was almost impossible for the United States to enlist Iran’s support in the 
aftermath of ouster of the Iranian monarch, following the Iranian Revolution of February 197924. 
Therefore, Pakistan was seen as the only country with which the United States could easily revive its 
strategic relationship to overthrow the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hence, Pakistan came under 
international focus, and was praised with the words like ‘a pivotal state’, a ‘wedge’ and a ‘frontline 
country’ worth eulogizing (Farzana Shakoor, pp. 19-21; K. M. Arif, p. 185). The Carter administration was 
reported to have decided, in October 1978, to resume aid to Pakistan (Islam, p. 64)[25]. Pakistan was 
located at the Eastern flank of the Persian Gulf and, therefore, in case of any threat to her security, the 
security of the Persian Gulf would have been shattered which meant a direct armed confrontation 
between the two superpowers. Therefore, the United States decided to help Pakistan both militarily and 
economically in order to cope with any threat from the Soviet Union26.  
Pakistan was not only aware of her strategic importance but was also fully acquainted with the 
geopolitical realities of the region. Therefore, to maximize gains from any new engagement with the 
United States, Pakistan adopted a cautious course (Azmi, p. 237). Pakistan’s motives were not only the 
containment of the Soviet advance in South Asia but also included the inviolability of her eastern and 
western borders. For this purpose, Pakistan supported the internal Afghan resistance against Soviet 
forces to thwart out communist menace and establish a friendly regime in Kabul. Pakistan also needed 
the maintenance of a US-compatible government in Pakistan, and seeking an international recognition 
for her pro-West and anti-Soviet stance from the world at large (Rogers, pp. 101-102). Another factor was 
the establishment of US suzerainty over the Indian Ocean after the evacuation of British navy in the 
wake of World War-II. Pakistan had a strong aversion and resentment to any possible Indian superiority 
in the Indian Ocean (Rizvi, p. 216). Pakistan’s security was also linked with the Indian Ocean and Gulf 
region (Razvi, pp. 183-184). Besides these external factors, Pakistan was entangled in domestic problems. 
The military government in Pakistan was in high need of recognition from the United States and her 
Western allies. Therefore, Pakistan tried to grab the opportunity with both hands. General K. M. Arif, a 
close aide of General Ziaul Haq (1977-1988) and a Vice Chief of army staff, has portrayed the scenario 
in these words: 
 “The Soviet intervention provided an opportunity to Islamabad to take advantage of it 
without compromising her principles. However, Pakistan made it known to US that her nuclear 
program was not negotiable. And, Islamabad vigorously pursued it despite protests and veiled 
threats from Washington.” (K. M. Arif, pp. 185-190) 
                                                        
22 See US Department of State, Bulletin, May 1989, p. 4. 
23 K. Arif,  (ed.), America-Pakistan Relations…, p. 372; also see Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy…, pp. 84-85. 
24 Statement by Jack C. Miklos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, 
and African Affairs, Department of States), before the House CFA (House Committee on Foreign Affairs) 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 15 May 1979 
25 Islam, ‘The Afghan Factor’, p. 64. 
26 See Department of States Bulletin (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 83. 
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Thus, it was not only under external compulsions that Pakistan decided to revive the US-Pakistan 
strategic relationship but there were certain domestic factors too. To General K. M. Arif, “The US-led 
West wanted a Muslim country to remain in the forefront of the Afghan struggle, and Pakistan was 
willing to play such a role for her own domestic and security reasons.” According to him, the western 
media suddenly ‘discovered’ that Zia, the dictator was, in fact, a ‘good guy’. His opposition to the 
communist invasion in Afghanistan evoked sympathy and support. Pakistan’s decision to act as a conduit 
for western weapons to Kabul was eulogized.  
This is a fact that the US has always found it very easy to deal with a dictator instead of a 
democratically elected government in Pakistan. That is the reason to suggest that the US-Pakistan 
relationship flourishes much under a military regime in Pakistan and the most subversive factor to the 
democratic culture in Pakistan has been the US support for dictators. This time again there was a military 
ruler to bail out the United States from this monster.  
The US attitude towards Pakistan underwent a literally overnight change (Naunihal Singh, p. 291). The 
President Jimmy Carter not only declared Pakistan a frontline state between the Soviet Union and the 
‘free-world’ and reaffirmed the 1959 bilateral security agreement which was aimed at cooperation 
against communism (Kux, p. 302). President Carter unequivocally declared, “We will provide military 
equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security 
against the seriously increased threat from the North”27. In a message to the US Congress, President 
Carter stated, “the United States will take action to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression”28. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, and Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, 
rushed to Islamabad on 1 February 1980, to ease tension between the two countries (Noor A. Husain, 
1985.). They made an offer of US $400 million in economic and military assistance to Pakistan over a 
period of 18 months (Kux, p. 302). Pakistan rejected the offer but kept on her resentment against Soviet 
intervention. The two reasons put forward for turning down the US offer were: it did not commensurate 
with the magnitude of threat, and it did not further a credible US-Pakistan relationship (Rogers, p. 117). 
This non-acceptance in 1980 reduced the risk of direct involvement of Pakistan in the Cold War orbit and 
projected the Afghan cause in its genuine perspective of liberation of Afghanistan (Abdul Sattar, pp. 
158-159). It also helped Pakistan in the formation of a broad international diplomatic front against Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan that was not possible otherwise (Islam, p. 70).  
The next US administration under Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), ranked Pakistan high on the US 
national security agenda and, therefore, an assistance of US $3.5 billion, spread over five years, was 
proposed which was accepted. The United States recognized Pakistan as an important regional ally for 
three reasons; Pakistan’s geographical proximity to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan; her possible key 
strategic role in the prevention of Soviet hold over Afghanistan; and her role as a barrier against any 
further Soviet expansion in the southward direction (Ibid., p.74). Jane A. Coon, the US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of States for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, expressed the readiness of the 
United States to help Pakistan cope with the threat emanating from the latter’s northwest i.e. Soviet Red 
Army in Afghanistan. A military and economic aid package along with the sale of 40 F-16 warplanes 
was agreed upon. Thus, under Reagan administration, the United States and Pakistan came closer due to 
the striking coincidence of strategic Soviet threat. Although there was a sharp divergence of perceptions 
yet there was a close resemblance of target which engaged them in a new paradigm of strategic 
partnership. Pakistan and the US were operating from two different perspectives. The United States 
wanted to contain Soviet Union in order to safeguard the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf and secure 
the Indian Ocean suzerainty while Pakistan was apprehended by the Indian and Afghan factor. The Gulf 
region was also politically, strategically, religiously and economically important for Pakistan because it 
has common religious, political and economic ties with the Persian Gulf countries. Moreover, they could 
provide a strategic depth to Pakistan that was already anxious about her narrow strategic waist. For the 
US, the underlying considerations were global but for Pakistan, only regional considerations were 
important (Rizvi, p. 207). However, the nuclear differences lurked below the surface as this new 
relationship flourished. The nuclear relations got a new dimension when US administration abruptly 
                                                        
27 This statement was issued by Jimmy Carter on 4 January 1980. See Naunihal Singh, The United States and 
Pakistan…, p. 294. 
28 President Carter’s State of the Union … on 21 January 1980. 
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changed her tone and accepted Pakistan’s assurances of not developing a nuclear weapon and nuclear 
non-proliferation (Rashmi Jain (ed.), pp. 377-378). To safeguard the US interests in Afghanistan and the 
Middle East, President Reagan buried the non-proliferation by dismantling the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency that was set up by the former US President John F. Kennedy. The National 
Security Council and the office of the National Security Advisor in the US were both degraded (Adrian 
Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007). President Reagan and William Casey, the Director CIA, were 
unanimous in their views that winning a war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan was a vital strategic 
objective of the US that could not be overlooked. For this purpose, they wanted to fuel the insurgency in 
Afghanistan by arming and funding them from the Pakistani soil to bog down the Soviet Red Army, just 
as the Soviets had done against the US troops in Vietnam. Thus, the US officials focused on Pakistan and 
pledged to ignore her much criticized nuclear program. Despite remaining outwardly committed to the 
non-proliferation, Reagan administration did not resort to check Pakistan’s nuclear program by taking 
strict measures against the latter. Funds and arms were provided to Pakistan through the CIA. In a press 
conference, the US President Ronald Reagan, candidly admitted the strategic value of Pakistan by saying 
that Pakistan was in a very important strategic position in the changing situation in Afghanistan. He also 
expressed his belief that it was in the US interests to be supportive to Pakistan29. Pakistan was exempted 
from the provisions of the Symington and Glenn Amendments (Noman Sattar, 1994). In order to promote 
the US interests in the region, Article 669 of the US Foreign Assistance Act was amended and some of 
the nuclear sanctions against Pakistan were waived30. However, US apprehensions over Pakistan’s 
nuclear program surfaced now and then due to the presence of some grey area and mutual mistrust in this 
field31. The voices against Pakistan’s nuclear posture mainly stemmed from the US Congress and not 
from the administration. But it is also not wrong to say that of all irritants between Pakistan and the 
United States, the nuclear issue was by far the most serious (Islam, p. 76). In 1983, despite the conduct of 
a ‘cold test’ of the nuclear device by Pakistan, the US left the former unabated (Levy and Scott-Clark, p. 5). 
The Pakistan-China nuclear collaboration was also left unattended by the US administration. However, 
sensing the threat from Pakistan’s nuclear program to the non-proliferation efforts, the US Senate 
adopted an amendment called the “Pressler Amendment” named after the US Senator Larry Pressler, 
who introduced it in 1985. Tying the US aid to Pakistan with the nuclear issue, this new amendment 
called for an annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Keeping in 
view the strategic US interests in Pakistan, the United States kept on issuing the required certificate in 
favor of Pakistan that paved the way for keeping smooth strategic relations intact32. The Reagan 
administration also urged the US Congress that curbing the US aid to Pakistan based on nuclear issue can 
hinder the US interests in the Southwest and South Asia (Islam, p. 77). In July 1987, following the 
conviction of Arshad Pervez, a Pakistani citizen living in Canada, on charges arising from his efforts to 
export a special steel alloy to Pakistan, the US president invoked the Solarz Amendment. The sanctions 
were considered counterproductive for the non-proliferation objectives and a blow for US Strategic 
interest in South Asia. Therefore, in a stroke of Presidential privileges, Reagan at the same time used his 
authority to waive against Pakistan under Symington and Solarz Amendment and in favor of US 
strategic interests in South Asia (Rogers, pp. 120-121).  In April 1988, the Geneva Accord was signed and 
it was a great watershed in the world politics and the politics of South Asia. Pakistan achieved one 
strategic goal of the evacuation of Soviet military from Afghanistan when the last Soviet soldier, General 
Boris Gromov, crossed ‘the Friendship Bridge’ of Oxus River on 15 February 1989 (Victoria Schofield, 
2003).  
 
                                                        
29 These remarks were given by the US President during a press conference On 16 June 1981, quoted in Levy and 
Scott-Clark, Deception. p. 379. 
30 US Department of States briefing on Pakistan’s nuclear intentions, 16 September 1981, also see Rashmi Jain (ed.), 
The United States and Pakistan…, pp. 378-379. 
31 See statement by Schaffer, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9 March 1983; 
quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), The United States and Pakistan…, pp. 383-384. 
32 See White House Statement, 15 January 1988. 
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FOURTH PHASE 
 
But for Pakistan, it was just the beginning of a long run. The other objectives were the end of the 
fratricidal war in Afghanistan, the return of normalcy to this war-ravaged country, achieving regional 
stability and preservation of unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan (K. M. Arif, pp. 186-187). The 
Soviet departure from Afghanistan brought a number of benefits for Pakistan but the costs were also very 
high. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan was the end of the 
strategic agenda for the United States and, thereafter, Kabul had no more significance in the US foreign 
policy. The departure of the Red Army and the collapse of Soviet Union put an end not only to the 
long-drawn Cold War but changed the strategic and political priorities of the United States. After the 
Soviet withdrawal, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States that had played the 
pivotal role in the Afghan War, wanted to clean its hands of the Afghanistan episode (Naunihal 
Singh,P354). In the given circumstances, the succeeding democratic governments in Pakistan and the 
expression of determination to the steadfastness of the US-Pakistan relations, the US interests in South 
Asia changed as she no longer needed allies against Soviet Union; nor could it be blackmailed by 
countries threatening it to go over to the rival camp. The shift in the focus of the United States on South 
Asia changed the US attitude towards Pakistan (Islam, p. 90). The strategic significance of Pakistan had 
diminished, as she had no longer remained the ‘front-line state’. The history repeated itself and once 
again, the nuclear issue dominated the US-Pakistan relations. With the end of Cold War, the US policy of 
negligence over Pakistan’s nuclear posture changed altogether. Nuclear sanctions were imposed under 
Pressler Amendment (1985) when the US President refused to issue the required certificate in 199033. 
The United States also denied the transfer of twenty-eight F-16 aircrafts and military equipments for 
which Pakistan had paid $658 million in advance. In fact, the Afghan issue and the Soviet threat, which 
had relegated the nuclear issue, were no longer existent. Congressional circles in the United States were 
firmly persuaded that in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the time had come to force 
Pakistan to abandon her quest for nuclear weapons (Islam, , p. 91). Thus, Pakistan was pushed from 
international esteem to international isolation just after losing her strategic importance. Even after aid 
cut-off, several efforts were made by Pakistan to mend fences with the United States but all in vain 
(Abdul Sattar, pp. 225-226). On the contrary, Pakistan was put on the watch list of states accused of 
sponsoring terrorism. Nevertheless, that was a problem of short-sightedness on the part of United States 
that she not only left Afghanistan at the disposal of the regional powers but overlooked the future 
strategic importance of Pakistan in her access to the oil-rich Caspian Basin. She also miscalculated the 
fatal repercussions of the war-nursery left behind in Afghanistan. The United States could not evaluate 
the outcomes of the Afghan Civil war.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The unique geo-strategic location of Pakistan has played a key role in attracting the United States 
towards Pakistan. The US has always come closer to Pakistan to win support of the latter to carry out the 
US international agenda or to eradicate a menace threatening the US interests directly or indirectly. Thus, 
whether it was the containment of communist advance in South Asia, the protection of the US interests in 
the oil-rich Middle East or the US war against terrorism, the US has desperately needed Pakistan because 
the fulfillment of these objectives was not possible without Pakistan's support. Pakistan has also sought 
to compensate her weak military position vis-à-vis India through close military ties with the United 
States. The US economic aid and political support were also needed by Pakistan. But looking at the 
equation of benefits, the United States has benefited more than Pakistan. The US triumph over the 
former Soviet Union, which made her the sole power, was indebted to Pakistan's unqualified support 
during the last phase of the Cold War. The present US hold over Afghanistan is due to the marvelous 
                                                        
33 Letter by US President Bush-I to his Pakistani counterpart, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, wherein the former expressed his 
inability to certify Pakistan’s compliance with the Pressler Amendment (1985), 18 September 1990. 
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intelligence and logistic support extended by Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's gains had remained 
only marginal. Through US support, Pakistan could never safeguard her national frontiers from frequent 
Indian aggressions, which was stated as the main objective of Pakistan's strategic support to the US, nor 
could prevent dismemberment of her Eastern wing in 1971. The two major benefits that Pakistan reaped 
were; the successful nuclear technology by turning off the US pressure in 1980s and the military strength 
got through US support. As far as the nuclear gains are concerned, Pakistan cannot claim herself secure 
even in the presence of nuclear umbrella. The build up of a strong and well-disciplined military 
institution is the other gift of close US-Pakistan relationship that has every now and then uprooted the 
democratic institutions of the country and obstructed the way of evolution of a national solidarity among 
the federating units of the country. It is also a fact that military has not been successful in defense of the 
state, which was its prime duty, and it is quite evident from the fall of Dhaka (1971) and misadventurism 
in Kargil Operation (1999). However, a strong Pakistani military was needed by the US as a stabilizing 
force to promote US interests in the Middle East and to crush any anti-US sentiments in Pakistan. This 
US objective has been successfully achieved by the Pakistan army.  However, the main drawback of the 
US-Pakistan relationship is its flimsy nature. The root-cause of this fragility in relations lies in the fact 
that the main driving force behind the intermittent close US-Pakistan relationship has not been the 
convergence of interest but the need to accomplish their separate, different and sometimes divergent 
interests through mutual collaboration. Only the geo-strategic factor cannot turn the alliance among the 
unequal partners into a durable and long-standing partnership and the same has proved true for the 
volatile US-Pakistan relationship. Each time the evaporation of strategic relevance of Pakistan has not 
only resulted in a cleavage in the US-Pakistan relations but also put the latter under much political, 
economic and diplomatic pressure than before.  
Since 9/11, Pakistan has once again become instrumental in the US strategic war against terrorism due 
to the strategic worth arising from her geographical proximity to Afghanistan, her military superiority in 
the region and sophisticated intelligence and logistic facilities. Analyzing the history of Pakistan's 
engagements with the United States, it can be predicted with greater degree of authenticity that this new 
phase will meet the same fate as in the past i.e. the US strategic interests in Pakistan will diminish as soon 
as her agenda gets materialized. At the end of this unmatchable relationship, Pakistan may face a number 
of dreadful consequences both at home and abroad. Once the US military hold over Afghanistan gets 
firm, the very existence of nuclear Pakistan will be put at stake. The United States would need an 
uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons from the mineral-rich Caspian basin. Only Pakistani ports of 
Gawader (constructed with Chinese support), and Karachi can provide the easiest roots for their direct 
and economical transportation. A peaceful, stable and sovereign Pakistan could become a hurdle to the 
smooth transit of the US shipments. The peace in Afghanistan would ultimately turn the US attention 
towards Pakistan and she would not leave any stone unturned in making her interests secure.  
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